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I. INTRODUCTION 
United States Army Private Bradley Manning made headlines in the fall of 2013 
when he was convicted of espionage, fraud, and theft for divulging classified 
military and diplomatic information to WikiLeaks.1 After the twenty-five year old 
was sentenced to thirty-five years in military prison, he made instantly made 
headlines again by announcing that he wanted to live as a woman in prison. 
Divulging that he has Gender Identity Disorder,2 Manning said that he had suffered 
                                                            
* Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. Former Dean of Students at Emory 
University School of Law, Duke University School of Law, and Barry University School of 
Law. 
 1 In subsequent parts of this Article, the female pronoun “she” is used to describe 
Manning. This stylistic decision was based on the Associated Press’ announcement that “it 
will use Pvt. Chelsea E. Manning and female pronouns for the soldier, in accordance with her 
wishes to live as a woman.” This comports with the transgender guidance in the AP 
Stylebook. See Associated Press, Bradley Manning Explains Gender Change, POLITICO (Aug. 
26, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/bradley-chelsea-manning-gender-change-
95928.html#ixzz2dI63RMBe; see also Paul Farhi, Media Wrestles with How to Refer to 
Manning, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-22/
lifestyle/41435592_1_bradley-manning-manning-s-david-coombs. 
 2 Gender Identity Disorder is renamed Gender Dysphoria in the Fifth Edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) which was released in May 
2013 at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association. THE DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n ed., 5th ed. 2013) 
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for years in the wrong body and that he would henceforth be recognized as a female, 
Chelsea Manning.3 The Army, however, has stated that it does not provide gender 
reassignment surgery or hormone therapy.4 The Army further responded that 
Manning would be incarcerated with males, would dress the same as all the male 
inmates, and would be called Bradley, not Chelsea.5 Manning’s attorney announced 
at the time that he might file suit to obtain hormone therapy treatment for his client.6 
Manning has also petitioned President Obama for a pardon.7 
This Article explores whether incarcerated inmates with Gender Dysphoria, such 
as Manning, have a constitutional right to receive medical treatment to effectuate 
gender transfer, and if so, whether they are likely to succeed in suing to obtain 
treatment if it is not provided by prison officials.8 One remedy is to bring a suit in 
federal court for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2006).9 The statute 
provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
                                                            
[hereinafter DSM-V]. This Article uses the term Gender Dysphoria except when the cited 
sources have used the term Gender Identity Disorder (GID) or transsexualism. To avoid 
confusion and to be faithful to the original sources, this Article employs the terminology used 
in those sources.  
 3 Aaron Blake & Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Comes Out as Transgender: “I Am 
Female”, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-22/world/
41435413_1_army-intelligence-analyst-bradley-manning-hormone-therapy; Richard A. 
Serrano, Manning Announces Plan to Live as Woman in Prison: Ex-Military Intel Analyst 
Asks to be Called Chelsea, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 2013, at A6, available at 
LexisNexis. 
 4 Serrano, supra note 3, at A6. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Associated Press, supra note 1 (stating that Manning and his attorney knew the 
Army might not provide hormone treatment, but hoped the military prison at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas would allow it since Manning had been diagnosed with gender-identity 
disorder by an Army psychiatrist who testified at his trial). 
 7 Richard A. Serrano, Manning Asks President for a Pardon and Freedom: Says Files 
Leaked “Out of Concern for my Country”, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 5, 2013, at A10, 
available at LexisNexis. 
 8 For purposes of analyzing Eighth Amendment considerations as they apply to 
incarcerated transgender persons, this Article addresses situations where the state has 
allegedly violated an inmate’s constitutional rights, but does not focus on any particular prison 
regulations or operating procedures. Regulations pertaining to incarceration in a military 
prison may differ from civilian Department of Corrections rules, just as state penitentiaries 
can be different from federal prisons.  
 9 The analysis is essentially the same regardless of whether an inmate sues a state prison 
official for deprivation of his or her Eighth Amendment right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) 
or whether an inmate in a federal penitentiary sues a federal official in a Bivens-style suit. 
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
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rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress.10 
The specific constitutional right implicated in prison cases is the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.11 In cases involving 
the conditions of confinement and the need for medical care, the inmate alleges that 
he has been deprived of his constitutional rights by the prison officials’ failure to 
provide for his fundamental needs such as food, shelter, clothing, safety, and medical 
care.12 The Supreme Court stated in a 1976 decision involving an incarcerated 
prisoner13 that when the State has actively restrained a person and deprived him of 
the ability to care for himself, the State has a constitutional duty of care or 
protection.14 It is the act of taking custody of a person that triggers the state’s duty to 
provide basic care for him.15 
This Article examines current jurisprudence on the subject of providing hormone 
therapy and other sex reassignment medical treatment to incarcerated prisoners with 
Gender Dysphoria. Part II discusses the two-pronged constitutional test for 
determining whether the state has violated a transgender inmate’s Eighth 
Amendment right to receive adequate medical care. Subpart II(A) looks at the 
objective prong of the test, that is, whether a prisoner with Gender Dysphoria has a 
“serious medical need”. Serious medical need is discussed in two subsections: (1) 
whether the medical profession regards Gender Dysphoria as an illness, and (2) 
whether courts treat it as a serious medical need. Subpart II(B) addresses the 
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment test and describes what “deliberate 
indifference” means in the context of inmates who seek medical treatment.  
Part III addresses some reactions to Private Manning’s request for Gender 
Dysphoria treatment as well as various viewpoints on whether prisoners ought to 
receive medical care at taxpayers’ expense.  
Part IV is the Conclusion, which argues that the right thing to do is to provide 
hormone therapy or other medical treatment to transgender inmates who meet the 
constitutional test. It would be cruel and unusual punishment for society to leave 
these inmates untreated—to let them suffer horribly for years on end—when the 
state has incarcerated them (although rightly so) and thus rendered them unable to 
provide for their own medical needs. 
II. THE TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE INMATE’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT WAS VIOLATED 
Evaluating a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim involves two inquiries: an 
objective component as to whether the inmate displays a “serious medical need,” and 
a subjective component as to whether the prison officials were “deliberately 
                                                            
 10 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2006) .  
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 12 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
 13 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). 
 14 Id. at 104. 
 15 Id. at 103. 
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indifferent” to that need.16 Quoting the Second Circuit, a federal district court 
recently articulated the test in a case involving an inmate with Gender Dysphoria: 
“The objective ‘medical need’ element measures the severity of the alleged 
deprivation, while the subjective ‘deliberate indifference’ element ensures that the 
defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”17 
A. The Objective Part of the Test: Whether a Transgender Inmate Demonstrates a 
Serious Need for Medical Care 
To decide whether a prisoner has an Eighth Amendment right to receive medical 
treatment for gender reassignment, prison officials must determine whether such 
medical care is necessary. That determination hinges on whether treatment of 
Gender Dysphoria is a serious medical need.18 If medical treatment is optional or 
elective, then the state has no duty to provide such care.19  
1. Does the Medical Profession View Gender Dysphoria as Presenting a “Serious 
Medical Need”? 
Gender Dysphoria is described as the feeling of being trapped in the wrong body; 
for example, Private Manning said that for most of his life, he had felt like a woman 
imprisoned in a man’s body.20 The American Psychiatric Association’s new edition 
of the diagnostic manual describes the symptoms of Gender Dysphoria as “[a] 
marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned 
gender, of at least [six] 6 months duration, as manifested by [two] 2 or more . . . 
indicators.” 21 The indicators include “a strong desire to be rid of one’s primary 
and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a marked incongruence with one’s 
experienced/expressed gender,” “a strong desire for the primary and/or secondary 
sex characteristics of the other gender,” “a strong desire to be of the other gender,” 
and “a strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other 
gender.”22 Additionally, Gender Dysphoria “is associated with clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.”23 
 The question is whether medical treatment for Gender Dysphoria is considered 
elective (similar to rhinoplasty or corrective vision surgery), necessary (similar to 
treatment for other diagnosed medical illnesses ranging from cancer to 
                                                            
 16 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 309 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated in part by 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 17 Id. (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 18 Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 855 (E.D. Wis. 2010), aff'd, 653 F.3d 550 (7th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1810 (2012). 
 19 Garrett v. Elko, 120 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 20 Bradley Manning Identifies as Transgender: Transitioning Explained, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
23, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-204_162-57599881/bradley-manning-
identifies-as-transgender-transitioning-explained/. 
 21 DSM-V, supra note 2, at 452. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 453. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/5
2013] GENDER DYSPHORIA IN THE JAILHOUSE 961 
 
schizophrenia), or whether it falls into that grey area where treatment is sometimes, 
but not always, medically indicated.  
The issue is a sensitive one because the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria as a 
medical illness has a negative connotation to members of the transgender 
community. If, however, the condition is not recognized as an illness, then medical 
treatment may not be deemed necessary.24 Typically, Gender Dysphoria is diagnosed 
as a mental illness. Another possible medical explanation–as yet unproven–is that 
“there are critical periods of development during fetal or neonatal life during which 
exposure to testosterone influences the sexual differentiation of the brain.”25  
One writer noted that “[t]raditionally, transgender inmates have gained access to 
hormone therapy by appealing to the DSM-IV's classification of Gender Identity 
Disorder as a mental illness, and by establishing that prison officials' failure to 
provide hormone therapy constitutes deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
need.”26 Some poignantly note that labeling Gender Identity Disorder as a mental 
illness is “a double-edged sword: while it allows access to hormone therapy, it does 
so by describing transgender individuals as somehow sick or infirm,” and “[t]his 
description is at odds with the transgender community's conceptualization of 
itself.”27 
The Standards of Care published by the World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health (WPATH) are recognized as protocols for the treatment of 
Gender Identity Disorder.28 Called a “triadic approach,” this widely accepted 
treatment plan involves three sequential steps: (1) hormone therapy, (2) a period of 
time living as the opposite gender, and (3) sex reassignment surgery.29 Medical 
treatment is not always necessary or desirable, however. Not all transgender 
individuals are dysphoric; many do not need or seek medical attention, according to 
a member of the American Psychiatric Association’s subcommittee on the revision 
of the psychiatric diagnostic manual.30 One commentator on gender identity issues 
has explained: 
                                                            
 24 See Camille Beredjick, DSM-V To Rename Gender Identity Disorder “Gender 
Dysphoria”, ADVOCATE.COM (Jul. 23, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/
transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria (stating that 
a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder can make the difference between obtaining insurance 
coverage for gender reassignment surgery and other medical procedures and not obtaining 
coverage).  
 25 Bradley Manning Identifies as Transgender: Transitioning Explained, supra note 20. 
 26 Silpa Maruri, Hormone Therapy for Inmates: A Metonym for Transgender Rights, 20 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807 (2011). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Previously called The Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, this three-step treatment 
protocol is referenced by many courts. See, e.g., O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 37 
(T.C. 2010); see also Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156,158-59 (D. Mass. 2002). The 
standards can be found at http://www.wpath.org/uploaded_files/140/files/
IJT%20SOC,%20V7.pdf. 
 29 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 38. 
 30 See Beredjick, supra note 24. 
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Perhaps the most common misunderstanding is the belief that all 
transgender people undergo genital surgery (phalloplasty or 
vaginoplasty—the creation of a penis or vagina) as the primary medical 
treatment for changing gender. In fact, gender-confirming health care is 
individualized treatment that differs according to the medical needs and 
pre-existing conditions of individual transgender people. Some 
transgender people undergo no medical care related to their expression of 
a gender identity that differs from their birth-assigned sex. Others undergo 
only hormone therapy treatment or any of a number of surgical 
procedures.31 
Medical testimony has been given at trial to the effect that “[f]or some people the 
disorder is so intense and so severe, . . . they simply cannot function unless they do 
something to correct this disorder. For other people the discomfort is less intense, 
and they are able to manage the condition over a lifetime.”32 Thus, the need for 
medical treatment varies significantly from case to case, and an inmate’s request 
must be evaluated on an individual basis. 
2. Gender Dysphoria: Have Courts Recognized Treatment as a “Serious Medical 
Need”? 
When presented with prisoners’ claims of constitutional deprivation, courts have 
struggled to determine whether medical treatment is necessary for inmates with 
Gender Dysphoria.33 Factors to use in assessing whether an inmate has a serious 
medical need include: (1) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the 
medical need in question as “important and worthy of comment or treatment,” (2) 
whether the medical condition significantly affects daily activities, and (3) whether 
“chronic and substantial pain” exists.34 “A serious medical need is one that involves 
a substantial risk of serious harm if it is not treated.”35  
Many courts have held that treatment for Gender Dysphoria is a “serious medical 
need” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.36 Specifically, the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all concluded that Gender Dysphoria constitutes a 
                                                            
 31 Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 754 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 32 Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841-42 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (quoting the trial 
transcript testimony of Dr. R. Ettner). 
 33 See, e.g., id. at 856-62 (providing detailed reasoning from prior cases and holding 
unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute prohibiting Gender Identity Disorder treatment in state 
prisons); see also Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 899-905 (E.D. Wis. 2010) 
(reviewing several prior cases). 
 34 Konitzer, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 898; see also Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 309 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated in part by 289 F. Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 35 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[t]ypically, 
it is a need that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so 
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention”); 
accord Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241-42 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 36 Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
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serious medical need.37 In this Section of the Article, several cases are presented to 
illustrate how courts have addressed the objective prong of the constitutional test. 
More than twenty-five years ago, the Seventh Circuit took the position that 
“transsexualism” presents a serious medical need.38 The inmate in that case had been 
living as a female since the age of fourteen and had received hormone therapy and 
other Gender Dysphoria treatment for nine years prior to being incarcerated.39 Once 
imprisoned, she was denied “all medical treatment—chemical, psychiatric or 
otherwise—for her GID and related medical needs.”40 She suffered severe 
withdrawal symptoms from the hormone therapy, and requested estrogen. Although 
the district court characterized her request as a claim for “elective medication” and 
dismissed her case, the Seventh Circuit disagreed, announcing that transsexualism 
presented a serious medical need.41 The court concluded that the prisoner had stated 
a valid Eighth Amendment claim “which, if proven, would entitle her to some kind 
of medical treatment.”42 The court emphasized that the inmate did not “have a right 
to any particular type of treatment, such as estrogen therapy…” but concluded that 
some type of medical treatment was necessary.43  
The Seventh Circuit’s current stance is that inmates with Gender Dysphoria 
should receive medical treatment,44 but in a rather dramatic 1997 opinion, one 
Seventh Circuit panel deviated from the majority view and took the opposite 
position.45 That court stated in Maggert v. Hanks, “except in special circumstances 
that we do not at present foresee, the Eighth Amendment does not entitle a prison 
inmate to curative treatment for his gender dysphoria.”46 The appellate court 
indicated that the prisoner’s suit was properly dismissed because Maggert, the 
inmate, had failed to submit evidence to contradict the prison psychiatrist’s opinion 
that Maggert did not have Gender Dysphoria and did not need estrogen.47 The 
Seventh Circuit seized the occasion to go beyond the narrow constraints of the 
Maggert case and address what it labeled “a broader issue,” that is, “the problematic 
character” of “the jurisprudence of transsexualism.”48  
In Maggert, the Seventh Circuit described Gender Dysphoria as “a serious 
psychiatric disorder” and said that “someone eager to undergo this mutilation [sex 
                                                            
 37 Id. 
 38 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 395 
(1987). 
 39 Id. at 410. 
 40 Id. at 413. 
 41 Id. at 411-13. 
 42 Id. at 413. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 862 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 45 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 46 Id. at 672. 
 47 Id. at 671. 
 48 Id. 
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reassignment surgery] is plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric disorder.”49 
This description would seem to indicate that Gender Dysphoria is a psychiatric 
disorder of such magnitude as to amount to a “serious medical need,” thus satisfying 
the objective prong of the constitutional test. The court, surprisingly, insisted 
however that “it does not follow that the prisons have a duty to authorize the 
hormonal and surgical procedures that in most cases at least would be necessary to 
‘cure’ a prisoner’s gender dysphoria.”50 The opinion implied, then, that the reason 
why the court labeled “the jurisprudence of transsexualism” as “problematic” is that 
it disagreed with the dominant view, which is that the prison has a duty to provide 
curative treatment once Gender Dysphoria is diagnosed as a serious medical need.51 
The Maggert panel reached the opposite conclusion. Calling hormone therapy and 
surgical treatments “protracted and expensive,” the Seventh Circuit stated: “A prison 
is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner medical care that is as 
good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person. 
He is entitled only to minimum care.”52 This statement leaves unanswered the 
question as to what other type of “minimum care” the prison could possibly provide 
to a transgender inmate when there are no successful “nonradical treatments” for 
Gender Dysphoria, as the court itself acknowledged.53 Continuing, the court 
addressed Eighth Amendment concerns: 
Withholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the 
wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment. It is not unusual; and we cannot see what is cruel about 
refusing a benefit to a person who could not have obtained the benefit if 
he had refrained from committing crimes. We do not want transsexuals 
committing crimes because it is the only route to obtaining a cure.54 
In its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit stated that a transgender inmate is entitled 
to be protected so that he is not used as “a sexual plaything.”55 That conclusion is 
relevant to an inmate’s right to safety while incarcerated, but it does not address his 
right to receive needed medical care. Ultimately, that court did not provide an 
answer as to what “minimum” medical care a transgender inmate could or should 
receive.56  
                                                            
 49 Id. The court made a slightly inconsistent statement: “Gender Dysphoria is not, at least 
not yet, generally considered a severe enough condition to warrant expensive treatment at the 
expense of others than the person suffering from it.” Id. at 672. 
 50 Id. at 671 (stating also that although some cases imply that less drastic and less costly 
treatments exist, this court found “only one report” of a “successful nonradical treatment,” and 
seeming to dismiss the less radical treatment as unsuccessful and undesirable). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 672 (emphasis added). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Moreover, the standard as articulated by courts more recently is not “minimum care,” it 
is “adequate care.” Providing adequate care can mean doing more than the bare minimum to 
address a prisoner’s medical needs. See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 207 (D. Mass. 2012). 
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Most recently, the Seventh Circuit has taken a clear, strong position supporting 
the provision of necessary medical treatment, including hormone therapy and 
gender-reassignment surgery, when it is prescribed for transgender prisoners.57 In 
Fields v. Smith, the court refuted and discredited the earlier Maggert dicta about the 
high cost of Gender Dysphoria treatments by pointing to evidence that the cost of 
hormone therapy varies between $300 and $1,000 per inmate per year whereas a 
common anti-psychotic drug costs the prison more than $2,500 per inmate per year.58 
Additionally, although gender-reassignment surgery costs roughly $20,000, the 
Department of Corrections “paid $37,244 for one coronary bypass surgery and 
$32,897 for one kidney transplant surgery.”59 Therefore, Gender Dysphoria 
treatment is not unusually expensive and is actually less costly than other types of 
medical care that many prisoners receive. The Fields court struck down a 2005 
Wisconsin statute60 that outlawed the use of state funds to provide hormone therapy 
and/or gender-transfer surgery to prisoners.61 Concluding that the statute was 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied, the court stated, “[j]ust as the legislature 
cannot outlaw all effective cancer treatments for prison inmates, it cannot outlaw the 
only effective treatment for a serious condition like GID.”62 
Citing Fields v. Smith, a federal district court in Wisconsin63 stated in Konitzer v. 
Wall that “several courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
have considered gender identity disorder or transsexualism a serious medical need 
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”64 In an earlier suit brought by the same 
prisoner, Konitzer, the district court had reviewed extensive testimony from medical 
experts and had stated, “[c]onsensus exists among experts that estrogen therapy is a 
cornerstone of treatment for a male-to-female individual with GID, while nuances of 
type and dose remain controversial, or at least subject to much diversity of 
opinion.”65 In summary, the current position of the Seventh Circuit is that Gender 
Dysphoria presents a serious medical need and that hormone therapy is an accepted, 
appropriate treatment. 
                                                            
 57 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1810 (2012). 
 58 Id. at 555. 
 59 Id. 
 60 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 302.386(5m) (West 2010). 
 61 Fields, 653 F.3d at 559. 
 62 Id. at 557. “Surely, had the Wisconsin legislature passed a law that DOC inmates with 
cancer must be treated only with therapy and pain killers, this court would have no trouble 
concluding that the law was unconstitutional. Refusing to provide effective treatment for a 
serious medical condition serves no valid penological purpose and amounts to torture.” Id. at 
556. 
 63 A federal district court sitting in Wisconsin is within the jurisdiction of the Seventh 
Circuit. UNITED STATES COURTS, GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 64 Konitzer v. Wall, No. 12-cv-874-bbc, 2013 WL 2297059, at *3 (W.D. Wis. May 24, 
2013). 
 65 Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 889 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
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In Battista v. Clarke, the First Circuit also emphasized in 2011 that Gender 
Dysphoria presents a serious medical need.66 That case involved a civil inmate who 
had first requested hormone therapy fifteen years earlier, but who received only a 
few sporadic treatments despite recommendations from health professionals.67 Even 
after the inmate mutilated his genitals with a razor, officials refused to provide the 
requested hormone therapy to treat gender identity disorder.68 Ruling in favor of the 
inmate, the First Circuit stated, “[i]t may take some education to comprehend that 
GID is a disorder that can be extremely dangerous, but the education seems to have 
taken an unduly long time in this instance, especially in light of the self-mutilation 
attempt.”69 
The Fifth Circuit has also treated Gender Dysphoria as a serious medical need.70 
The court stated in 2005 that it was “assuming, without deciding, that transsexualism 
does present a serious medical need.”71 Despite that acknowledgement, the court 
denied hormone therapy to the inmate in that case, Praylor, after the prison’s medical 
director testified that Praylor had already been evaluated and denied the treatment 
twice.72 The denial was based partly on “the lack of medical necessity for the 
hormone,” but also partly on “the prison’s inability to perform a sex-change 
operation” and “the disruption to the all-male prison.”73 The inmate had not asked 
for surgery, but had only requested hormone therapy and brassieres. Although the 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that gender identity disorder presents a serious medical 
need, the panel seemed to balk at the treatment and upheld the district court’s refusal 
to accommodate Praylor’s request.74  
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit has also “assumed without deciding that 
[an inmate’s] gender identity disorder constitutes a serious medical need.”75 
However, the court held in Long v. Nix that the inmate had not presented a viable 
Eighth Amendment claim because it was his own fault that prison officials did not 
treat his gender identity disorder.76 He repeatedly refused psychological counseling 
over a period of twenty years.77 “Having no apparent interest in overcoming his GID, 
                                                            
 66 Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 67 Id. at 450 (explaining that Battista had served a prison sentence for rape, robbery, and 
kidnapping, and had afterwards been involuntarily committed to the civil facility where this 
claim arose). 
 68 Id. at 450-51. 
 69 Id. at 455. 
 70 Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 71 Id. at 1209. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (basing its decision on the deliberate indifference standard, discussed infra). 
 75 Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 76 Id. at 766. 
 77 Id. 
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Long [the inmate] has frustrated the attempts of prison doctors to treat that disorder,” 
stated the court.78 
A federal district court in Massachusetts held in 2012 that a transgender prisoner, 
Michelle Kosilek, demonstrated a serious medical need for which the Eighth 
Amendment requires treatment.79 Kosilek had received psychotherapy, Prozac, and 
hormone treatment while incarcerated but continued to suffer such extreme mental 
distress that he tried to castrate himself and to kill himself.80 The treatment he had 
already received did not amount to “adequate medical care,” according to the court, 
as that standard necessitates providing “services at a level reasonably commensurate 
with modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional 
standards.”81 While acknowledging that “adequate” care does not mean “ideal care 
or the care of his choice,”82 the court held that Kosilek satisfied the objective prong 
of the test (proving a serious medical need) and that sex reassignment surgery would 
be the only adequate treatment for him.83 The court granted an injunction ordering 
gender reassignment surgery. 
Even the United States Tax Court concluded that Gender Identity Disorder “is a 
‘disease’ within the meaning of section 213 [of the Internal Revenue Code] after 
reviewing extensive medical evidence and opinions from other courts.84 That court 
rejected the Commissioner’s argument that “GID is ‘not a serious psychiatric 
disorder’” but is simply “a social construction” or “a social phenomenon that has 
been ‘medicalized’.”85 Instead, GID is “a serious, psychologically debilitating 
condition” and a “widely recognized and accepted diagnosis in the field of 
psychiatry,” held the court.86 Finally, the tax court stated that the Commissioner’s 
view that “GID is not a significant psychiatric disorder is at odds with the position of 
every U.S. Court of Appeals that has ruled on the question of whether GID poses a 
serious medical need for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”87 
To the extent that the circuits differ, it is not over whether Gender Dysphoria 
constitutes a serious medical need, but over whether treatment is warranted in a 
specific case, and if so, what type of treatment should be provided. The objective 
prong of the test under § 1983—“serious medical need”—can typically be satisfied 
by the inmate. The predominant view currently is that some medical treatment for 
Gender Dysphoria will be necessary in almost every case after the facts are reviewed 
in each instance. If treatment is medically prescribed, the prisoner has a right to 
                                                            
 78 Id. 
 79 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 229-30 (D. Mass. 2012) (using the male pronoun to 
describe Michelle Kosilek). 
 80 Id. at 197. 
 81 Id. at 207. 
 82 Id. at 208. 
 83 Id. at 236. 
 84 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 59 (T.C. 2010). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 60-61. 
 87 Id. at 61-62. 
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receive that treatment while in custody, and the state has a correlative duty to 
provide it.  
B. The Subjective Prong: Whether Prison Officials’ Actions Have Deprived the 
Inmate of an Eighth Amendment Right 
If prison officials do not provide medical care to an inmate, the proper standard 
to apply when determining whether they are guilty of a constitutional violation is the 
“deliberate indifference” test.88 In Farmer v. Brennan,89 the Supreme Court held that 
the deliberate indifference test is a subjective standard based on what the prison 
official knew.90 The Court stated:  
We reject petitioner's invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate 
indifference. We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable 
under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions 
of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive 
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.91 
The Supreme Court borrowed the standard of “subjective recklessness” as used 
in criminal law and adopted it as the standard for determining “deliberate 
indifference” in the Eighth Amendment context.92 The prison official must “actually 
know of and disregard an objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of 
harm.”93 
Liability will not attach if the prison administrator made a reasonable effort to 
fulfill the duty of providing the inmate with humane conditions of incarceration; the 
prison official may only be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if he fails to 
“take reasonable measures” to abate the known risks and prevent harm to the 
prisoner.94 Prison administrators are not liable for failing to provide medical care if 
they were not aware that treatment was needed. Nor will they be held liable for 
failing to provide the exact treatment plan that the inmate might prefer.95 The duty is 
to provide adequate, necessary care.96  
                                                            
 88 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 837-38. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 839-40 (“Subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law is a familiar and 
workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as 
interpreted in our cases, and we adopt it as the test for ‘deliberate indifference’ under the 
Eighth Amendment.”). 
 93 Id. at 837. 
 94 Id. at 845 (“Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison 
officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.”).  
 95 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 96 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. 
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The Eleventh Circuit has stated that when medical treatment is provided, but is 
alleged to be inadequate, the test is whether the treatment was “so grossly 
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable 
to fundamental fairness.”97 The standard is high, and proving deliberate indifference 
can be difficult. Thus, while most courts recognize that Gender Dysphoria presents a 
serious medical need, there is less uniformity as to whether prison officials have 
been found to be deliberately indifferent to that need. The results depend on a case-
by-case assessment of the inmate’s condition.98 
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit held that an inmate presented a viable deliberate 
indifference claim when prison officials knew of her “overwhelming urges to self-
castrate” but refused to have her evaluated for potential gender transformation 
surgery.99 Their efforts were not deemed to be “reasonable measures” even though 
prison officials argued that they had fulfilled their duty by providing hormone 
treatment and mental health counseling as well as by allowing her to dress as a 
woman in the correctional facility.100 The court stated that “just because Appellees 
have provided De’lonta with some treatment consistent with the GID Standards of 
Care, it does not follow that they have necessarily provided her with constitutionally 
adequate treatment.”101 Clarifying that the prisoner does not have a right to “the 
treatment of his or her choice,” the court emphasized nonetheless that the treatment 
had to be adequate to address the inmate’s serious medical need.102 In De’lonta’s 
case, since other forms of treatment were provided but did not resolve the prisoner’s 
GID symptoms, she had a right to be evaluated for possible surgery.103 Thus, because 
prison officials ignored her ongoing symptoms as well as her plea for surgery, 
De’lonta stated a viable claim that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent in 
that the Gender Dysphoria treatment they provided her did not constitute “reasonable 
measures” in a constitutional sense.104 In August 2013, on remand, a federal district 
court judge ruled that De’lonta is entitled to be evaluated by the “gender identity 
specialist of her choice.”105 
                                                            
 97 See Howard v. Green, No. 5:10-cv-207, 2011 WL 4969599, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 
2011) (applying language from Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) in a 
transgender inmate case brought by pro se inmate Clarence Howard). 
 98 Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 244 (D. Mass. 2012) (“Whether GID creates a 
serious medical need for which the Eighth Amendment requires treatment in any given case 
depends on the severity of the individual inmate’s disorder.”). 
 99 De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525-26 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 100 Id. at 525. 
 101 Id. at 526. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 526 n.4 (stating that the district court had pointed out that “absent a doctor’s 
recommendation, De’lonta cannot show a demonstrable need for sex reassignment surgery,” 
but emphasizing, “[w]e struggle to discern how De’lonta could have possibly satisfied that 
condition when . . . appellees have never allowed her to be evaluated by a GID specialist in 
the first place”). 
 104 Id. at 526-27.  
 105 Inmate One Step Closer to Getting Virginia to Shell Out $20k for her Sex-Change 
Operation, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/29/inmate-one-step-closer-
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Deliberate indifference does not necessarily mean that prison officials have 
completely ignored a prisoner’s condition. “Denial, delay, or interference with 
prescribed health care” can constitute deliberate indifference, stated a federal district 
court in Kosilek II.106 The court added, however, that prison officials are entitled to 
some deference in running the facility, and the “deliberate indifference test ‘leaves 
room for professional judgment, constraints presented by the institutional setting, 
and the need to give latitude to administrators who have to make difficult trade-offs 
as to risks and resources’.”107 Treatment can be denied if bona fide considerations of 
prison safety and security outweigh the benefit of providing medical care to the 
inmate.108 However, denying treatment based on cost or on a policy of blanket denial 
would not be deemed reasonable.109 Such a denial is not based on a penological 
justification and could constitute the unnecessary infliction of pain on a transgender 
prisoner.110 The wanton infliction of unnecessary pain violates the Eighth 
Amendment.111  
In Kosilek II, the court concluded that gender reassignment surgery had been 
improperly denied to inmate Kosilek because of a pattern of “pretense and 
prevarication” on the part of the Department of Corrections Commissioner.112 
Although the Commissioner claimed that the medical treatment was denied due to 
serious security considerations, the court found that the security concerns were 
pretextual and that the real reason was a fear of ridicule and scorn.113 The 
Commissioner testified at a bench trial that she would rather resign than obey an 
order from the Supreme Court to authorize sex reassignment surgery to an inmate.114 
She implemented a program of denial and delay to prevent Kosilek from receiving 
surgery.115 Therefore, the deliberate indifference test was met because the 
Commissioner and other prison administrators knew that Kosilek was at risk of 
                                                            
to-getting-virginia-to-shell-out-20k-for-her-sex-change/?test=latestnews#ixzz2dOjk3Vte (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
 106 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 209 (D. Mass. 2012); see also Rosati v. Igbinoso, No. 
1:12-cv-012013-RRB, 2013 WL 1790157 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2013) (stating that deliberate 
indifference can be shown when “prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with 
medical treatment”). 
 107 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (quoting Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st 
Cir. 2011)). 
 108 Id. at 210. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Hudson v. McMillion, 503 U.S. 1, 10-
11 (1991). 
 112 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197-98. 
 113 Id. at 198. 
 114 Id. at 220. 
 115 Id. 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/5
2013] GENDER DYSPHORIA IN THE JAILHOUSE 971 
 
serious harm and possible suicide if he did not have sex reassignment surgery, yet 
they refused to authorize the surgical procedure.116 The court continued, 
[A] prison official acts with deliberate indifference and violates the 
Eighth Amendment if, knowing of a real risk of serious harm, she denies 
adequate treatment for a serious medical need for a reason that is not 
rooted in the duties to manage a prison safely and to provide the basic 
necessities of life in a civilized society for the prisoners in her custody.117 
A Gender Identity disorder treatment plan must be formulated by medical 
professionals, not by prison administrators.118 In 2010, a federal court in Wisconsin 
stated that “[m]ere differences of opinion among medical personnel regarding a 
plaintiff’s appropriate treatment do not give rise to deliberate indifference.”119 
Nonetheless, if a medical professional’s decision departs substantially from 
“accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,” then deliberate indifference 
can be inferred.120 In the Wisconsin case, doctors agreed that even after receiving 
hormone therapy, inmate Konitzer continued to have a serious medical need that was 
unmet, as shown by his actions of cutting open his scrotum, tying a cord around his 
testes, castrating himself partially, and attempting suicide twice.121 The issue was 
whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical need when they 
refused to allow him the next step in the customary treatment protocol, that of 
“providing a real-life experience” as a member of the other gender.122  
The court indicated that a reasonable jury could find that the prison officials were 
“deliberately indifferent” when they failed to provide Konitzer with a real-life 
experience as a female, but also inquired whether the refusal was justified by “prison 
security concerns.”123 Konitzer wanted to put on make-up, wear female underwear, 
use facial hair remover, have female guards conduct the strip searches, and be 
referred to as a female while incarcerated.124 The court rejected the prison 
administrator’s argument that prison security would be jeopardized, noting that 
Konitzer had not been assaulted since 2006 “even though he has possessed female 
undergarments in violation of [prison] rules.”125 Remarking that he already looked 
like a female, the court stated, among other things, “Konitzer has breasts–bra or no 
bra.”126 Thus, unconvinced that security would be jeopardized if Konitzer got 
                                                            
 116 Id. at 203. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated in part by 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 119 Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 905. 
 122 Id. at 906. 
 123 Id. at 908. 
 124 Id. at 909. 
 125 Id. at 910. 
 126 Id. 
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permission to wear make-up and a bra, the court declined to grant summary 
judgment to the prison officials on that issue.127  
After that case was heard, prison officials and inmate Konitzer entered into a 
settlement agreement in 2010.128 In 2012, however, Konitzer again filed suit because 
prison officials had failed to treat her Gender Dysphoria despite the settlement 
agreement wherein the state agreed to provide an independent, expert evaluation of 
Konitzer, continue hormone therapy, consider implementing the gender identity 
expert’s recommendations, provide speech therapy to “feminize” Konitzer’s voice, 
and provide depilatories and hair loss treatments.129 The federal district court 
determined that Konitzer sufficiently alleged a “deliberate indifference claim” based 
on the fact that the prison officials induced her to settle “while knowing either that 
the adequate treatment was not going to be available or that they would not carry out 
their promises.”130 The court examined whether the refusal to provide treatment was 
based on reasonable professional judgment, saying “[m]edical ‘need’ in real life is an 
elastic term: security considerations also matter . . . and administrators have to 
balance conflicting demands.”131 The denial of treatment was not, however, based on 
legitimate penological concerns.132 
Prison officials may refuse treatment in some situations without violating a 
prisoner’s rights.133 “A difference of opinion between a prisoner and medical 
authorities regarding proper medical treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 
claim.”134 In a case where a prison had a policy that described specific conditions 
that a prisoner had to meet in order to qualify for hormone therapy, the refusal to 
provide hormone treatment was not “deliberate indifference” to the medical needs of 
an inmate, Allen [Brittney] Young, who did not meet the stated conditions.135 In 
addition, the prison officials in the Young case were found not to be deliberately 
indifferent because they had already addressed the prisoner’s repeated medical 
requests.136 The inmate had not been ignored or left to suffer.137 In fact, the prisoner’s 
                                                            
 127 Id. at 912-13. The court deferred to prison administrators on the question of whether 
Konitzer could be strip searched only by female officers. Strip searches were deemed 
particularly important to prison security and the correctional facility might legitimately have a 
“management issue” if forced to ensure that only female officers searched Konitzer, so the 
court left that issue to the prison’s shift commander to decide. 
 128 Konitzer v. Wall, No. 12-cv-874-bbc, 2013 WL 2297059, at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 24, 2013). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at *3. 
 131 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 200 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 132 Konitzer, 2013 WL 2297059, at *3. 
 133 Walls-Stewart v. Warner, No. C12-5381 RBL-JRC, 2013 WL 1755793, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 19, 2013). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Young v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch Corr. Health Care, No. 6:11cv363, 2012 WL 262983, 
at *15 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2012) (quoting Young v. Adams, 693 F. Supp. 2d 635 (W.D. Tex. 2010) 
(the case in which the same prisoner had already litigated the same claim in a different federal 
district court)). 
 136 Id. at *12. 
 137 Id. 
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medical record from 2007 to 2011 was over 2,000 pages long138 and it documented 
multiple medical appointments with prison doctors for a long list of reported 
ailments including “seizures, high blood pressure, asthma, C.O.P.D., Bi-polar, 
Gender Identity Disorder, sinusitis, and testicular cancer.”139 The inmate later added 
“back problems, cavities, depression, diabetes, drug and food allergies, epilepsy, 
hearing problems, gum disease, head injury, heart disease…mental illness, [and] 
peptic ulcers” to his list of medical problems after being transferred to another prison 
facility.140 Additionally, he persisted in telling various physicians that he was born a 
hermaphrodite and that he had had surgery to sew up his female parts, but several 
physical examinations revealed that he was a normally developed male with no 
evidence of surgery.141 The court concluded that prison officials had not been 
deliberately indifferent to Young’s medical needs, and that the inmate had merely 
shown that he disagreed with the prison’s policies, so his case was dismissed.142 
In another case where the prisoner’s request for treatment was not granted, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the denial of hormone therapy did not constitute “deliberate 
indifference.”143 In its per curiam opinion, the appellate court did not analyze 
deliberate indifference in any detail, but simply cited an Eighth Circuit case to 
support its decision that “declining to provide a transsexual with hormone treatment 
does not amount to acting with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.”144  
In that Eighth Circuit case, however, the court did not actually hold that a refusal 
to provide hormone treatment is not deliberate indifference on the part of prison 
officials.145 Rather, the Eighth Circuit decided that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether one particular inmate, Thomas White, was a 
transsexual.146 White had been evaluated by four medical experts who did not agree 
on a diagnosis.147 Further, the magistrate had completely ignored a prior diagnosis of 
transvestitism and paranoid schizophrenia.148 White willingly chose to wear a 
mustache even though he asked for electrolysis.149 On the other hand, White had 
                                                            
 138 Id. at *2. 
 139 Id. at *1. 
 140 Id. at *3. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at *13. 
 143 Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 144 Id. (citing White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 145 White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1988) (referencing in dicta the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding “that a prisoner has no constitutional right to estrogen, provided that some 
other treatment is made available to him.” (Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987))). 
 146 Id. at 326. If White were not a transsexual, there would be no need for treatment and the 
withholding of treatment would not be cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 328. 
 147 Id. at 324.  
 148 Id. at 326 (stating that “transvestites are comfortable with their sex; they cross-dress as 
females for sexual arousal rather than sexual comfort”). 
 149 Id. at 323. 
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attempted to castrate himself four times while in prison using various sharp objects 
such as the glass from his smashed television.150 In light of the conflicting evidence, 
the warden justifiably relied on an expert’s medical opinion that no medical need 
existed, so the refusal to provide treatment was not deliberate indifference, said the 
court.151 The case was remanded to resolve whether White was a transsexual and 
whether any treatment would be needed.152 
In the most severe cases where hormone therapy and counseling have been 
unsuccessful, as in the cases of inmates De’lonta and Kosilek, courts have held that 
additional treatment, i.e., surgery, must be considered.153 At the other end of the 
spectrum, where inmates could not prove that their medical requests had been 
ignored or derailed, or where they had not complied with prescribed treatments, the 
end result is simply that those inmates were not constitutionally entitled to the 
medical care of their choice.154 On balance, if an inmate can show that prison 
officials knowingly155 disregarded a documented need for Gender Dysphoria 
treatment, then it is very likely that the deliberate indifference test can be met.  
When both prongs of the test for bringing a successful § 1983 action are satisfied, 
it logically follows that withholding some type of Gender Dysphoria medical 
treatment violates an inmate’s Eighth Amendment right. It is impossible to predict 
with certainty what the result will be in any particular case because the need for 
medical treatment may be hard to prove, the subjective knowledge and indifference 
of prison administrators may be difficult to document, and other factors such as bias 
against transgender individuals and misunderstandings about Gender Dysphoria may 
influence the outcome. 
III. PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND STANDARDS OF CONTEMPORARY DECENCY 
The Private Manning case is a hard one. Not since the American Civil Liberties 
Union defended the Nazis’ right to march in Skokie has public sentiment been so 
aroused about where to draw the line between (a) supporting citizens who feel 
morally outraged, on the one hand, and (b) protecting constitutional rights, on the 
other hand.156 Manning violated the trust of everyone in the entire United States 
when she jeopardized national security by leaking 700,000 classified military 
                                                            
 150 Id. at 323-24. 
 151 Id. at 327. 
 152 Id. at 328. 
 153 See, e.g., De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526-27 (4th Cir. 2013); Kosilek v. 
Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 
2012). 
 154 See Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156. 
 155 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994) (“An act or omission unaccompanied 
by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to 
discourage . . . [b]ut an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 
perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be 
condemned as the infliction of punishment.” (emphasis added)).  
 156 See Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
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secrets.157 Now Manning wants the citizens of the United States to provide 
transgender therapy while she serves her sentence in military prison for fraud, 
espionage, and theft.158  
Manning has not previously received hormone therapy or other medical 
treatment for gender transformation.159 She waited, it would appear, until the 
moment that taxpayers would foot the medical bill to make her request for hormone 
treatment. There may be justifiable reasons for having waited, but the timing raises 
the public ire against Manning. It is true that Manning has offered to pay for 
hormone replacement treatment so that taxpayers will not bear the cost even though 
it may very well be true that Manning is legally entitled to receive the treatment from 
the government while incarcerated.160 
 Some in the transgender community, while applauding Manning’s courageous 
self-disclosure, have also said that the timing is not ideal for other reasons.161 
Manning may soon find that the “euphoric ‘I’ll-do-anything-it-takes’ feeling will 
pass and depression will set in again if she can’t move forward in her transition,” 
observed one transgender writer.162  
Manning certainly is not the first transgender prisoner to stir up public 
controversy. Kosilek, for example, whose case has been litigated for years, also 
aroused the ire of the press and the citizenry when he made his request for Gender 
Dysphoria treatment. 163 Kosilek was convicted in 1992 of murdering his wife after 
she became angry with him for wearing her clothes, and he was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.164 In reference to Kosilek’s request in court 
for gender-transfer treatment, a newspaper reporter wrote: 
                                                            
 157 Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal 
Leak of U.S. Files, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/
manning-sentenced-for-leaking-government-secrets.html?pagewanted=print. 
 158 Emmarie Huetteman, “I am a Female,” Manning Announces, Asking Army for 
Hormone Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/us/
bradley-manning-says-he-is-female.html; Beth Stebner, Army Pfc. Bradley Manning Acquitted 
of Aiding the Enemy, Convicted of Six Counts of Espionage, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 30, 
2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/bradley-manning-acquitted-aiding-enemy-
article-1 (outlining Bradley Manning’s charges and convictions).  
 159 See cases where inmates were already receiving therapy before being arrested, 
convicted, and incarcerated, and they sought merely to continue medically prescribed 
treatment. E.g., De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013). By contrast, Manning had 
not been previously treated for Gender Dysphoria, although an Army psychiatrist testified at 
the trial that Manning suffered from it. 
 160 Associated Press, supra note 1. 
 161 Jeff Kunnerth, Transgender Community Understands Bradley Manning’s Decision to 
Reveal Sexual Identity, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 30, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.
com/2013-08-30/features/os-transgender-bradley-manning-20130830_1_bradley-manning-
gender-identity-gina-duncan (quoting Maia Monet, an Orlando writer). 
 162 Id.  
 163 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 214-15 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 164 Id. at 213-15 (Kosilek’s wife, a volunteer where he was receiving drug rehabilitation 
treatment, told him that “his transsexualism could be cured by ‘a good woman.’” She married 
him, only to be garroted by him and stuffed into the trunk of their car.).  
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[w]hat’s truly remarkable is his ability to make a complete and utter fool 
out of an otherwise thoughtful and respected federal jurist…(s)he’s (sic) 
actually made a mockery of our entire penal system, and in the process is 
costing us thousands of dollars and dozens of hours of valuable court 
time.165 
As Kosilek continued to press for more treatment after years of incarceration, a 
Massachusetts state senator in 2005 called for legislation to prohibit the use of tax 
revenue to pay for gender identity treatment for prisoners, calling the idea 
“unconscionable.”166  
It does indeed seem unfair for convicted prisoners to receive free medical 
treatment from the government when innocent civilians have to pay for their own 
medical care. It seems downright odd and unjust that even though the general public 
in the United States has no right to guaranteed medical care, incarcerated criminals 
do.167 Such was the Seventh Circuit’s view in Maggert where the court stated that it 
is neither cruel nor unusual to deny medical care to a convicted criminal when he 
could not have afforded to get it on his own, if innocent.168  
Everyone knows someone who cannot afford to go to the doctor, and not all 
treatment is covered by insurance.169 Senior citizens sometimes choose which of 
their expensive prescriptions to fill, not being able to afford all of the drugs they 
need. Innocent, kindhearted, faithful people contract illnesses that go untreated. 
Others incur medical expenses that drive them into bankruptcy. Meanwhile, prison 
inmates receive medications, psychotherapy, and even surgery at taxpayers’ 
expense.170 The public outrage is perfectly understandable. The solution, however, is 
not to take away medical care from prisoners; it is to improve the availability of 
health care to all citizens. 
Another argument against providing hormone therapy and/or gender 
reassignment surgery is that such treatment wrongly “humors a patient’s false sense 
                                                            
 165 Id. at 215 (quoting Brian McGrory, A Test Case for Change, BOSTON GLOBE (June 13, 
2000),http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2000/06/13/test-case-for-change/s9jYsy33HXfJ3aj
RNZYpMO/story.html). 
 166 Id. at 223 (referencing a Channel 4 Eyewitness News show). 
 167 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002).  
 168 See Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997); see also supra text accompanying 
note 45. The opinion went way too far by suggesting that transgender people might commit 
crimes just to obtain free medical treatment while imprisoned. 
 169 As long ago as 1979, a court held that sex-reassignment surgery for a gender dysphoric 
patient was “imperative and necessary” for the plaintiff to “live a normal life,” and that 
insurance coverage could not be denied by defining the operation as “cosmetic surgery.” 
Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding 
insurance company responsible for all related medical expenses). This result, however, may 
not be reached in every case. 
 170 See, e.g., Kate Douglas, Prison Inmates Are Constitutionally Entitled to Organ 
Transplants—So Now What?, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539 (2005) (outlining prisoners’ rights to 
organ transplants); 60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal and Correctional Etc. § 99 (2013).  
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of gender identity.”171 The conservative Christian view, as expressed by one 
commentator, is that by ordering medical treatment for gender dysphoria, courts are 
“playing God” and “are acting on the presumption that we are not all created male 
and female, but that we are created male, female, male who should be female, and 
female who should be male.”172 Hormone therapy and surgery are denigrated as 
treatments that misguidedly “indulge a prisoner’s improper self-image;” the proper 
treatment simply ought to be counseling to help the transgender individual accept his 
physical gender, it is said.173 This argument, however, disregards the fact that 
psychological counseling is an inadequate remedy. Even the Maggert court, hostile 
as it was to transgender treatment, expressly acknowledged that there is no 
successful non-radical cure (such as psychotherapy).174 
Moreover, even the insurance industry (not known for willingly paying for 
unnecessary or unorthodox medical procedures) has treated gender reassignment 
surgery as appropriate and necessary for more than thirty years.175 Coverage was 
required after the Aetna decision in 1979 where the court stated: “Because it appears 
impossible to change the mind to fit the body, the surgery is aimed at changing the 
body to fit the mind.”176 Deeming it medically necessary, and not merely cosmetic, 
the court held that “the treatment and surgery involved in the sex change operation 
of the plaintiff is of a medical nature and is feasible and required for the health and 
well being of the plaintiff,” and accordingly, Aetna must cover “all medical expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff herein as a result of her undergoing sex-reassignment.”177  
Those who object to providing sex-reassignment therapy do not like the 
judiciary’s response, but it is legally correct—providing adequate medical care to 
prisoners is simply something that must be done due to the custodial nature of 
incarceration.178 When the state takes someone into custody and deprives him of the 
ability to take care of himself, the state assumes some duty to provide for his basic 
needs such as food, shelter, clothing, personal safety, and medical care.179 This rule 
was established almost forty years ago in the landmark case of Estelle v. Gamble, 
where the Supreme Court stated that “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to 
treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be 
met.”180 Noting that denial of medical care could result in pain and suffering and 
                                                            
 171 Rena Lindevaldsen, A State’s Obligation to Fund Hormonal Therapy and Sex-
Reassignment Surgery for Prisoners with Gender Identity Disorder, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 15, 
46 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 47.  
 174 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 175 Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
 176 Id.  
 177 Id. at 453. 
 178 See 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 4:1 (4th ed. 2013). 
 179 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976); see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 
(2011) (“To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their own 
needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing and necessary medical care.”).  
 180 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-04. 
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even “a lingering death,” the Court indicated that “[t]he infliction of such 
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.”181 
Therefore, “it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who 
cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.”182  
 “The idea that an imprisoned male murderer may ever have a right to receive 
female hormones and sex reassignment surgery may understandably strike some as 
bizarre,” wrote the federal district court in Massachusetts in Kosilek I.183 “However,” 
the court continued, “Kosilek’s claims raise issues involving substantial 
jurisprudence concerning the application of the Eighth Amendment to inmates with 
serious medical needs.”184 The court explained: “The Constitution does not protect 
this right because we are a nation that coddles criminals. Rather, we recognize and 
respect this right because we are, fundamentally, a decent people, and decent people 
do not allow other human beings in their custody to suffer needlessly from serious 
illness or injury.”185 
Ten years later, again addressing Kosilek’s medical requests in 2012, the district 
court stated “it has long been established that it is cruel for prison officials to permit 
an inmate to suffer unnecessarily from a serious medical need.”186 Further, the court 
said, “[i]t is unusual to treat a prisoner suffering severely from a gender identity 
disorder differently than the numerous inmates suffering from more familiar forms 
of mental illness,” and finally, “[i]t is not permissible for prisoner officials to do so 
just because the fact that a gender identity disorder is a major mental illness is not 
understood by much of the public and the required treatment for it is unpopular.”187 
The underlying social reasons for requiring prisons to provide medical treatment 
were expressed years ago by Justice Blackmun:188  
It is society's responsibility to protect the life and health of its prisoners. 
“[W]hen a sheriff or a marshal [sic] takes a man from the courthouse in a 
prison van and transports him to confinement for two or three or ten 
years, this is our act. We have tolled the bell for him. And whether we 
like it or not, we have made him our collective responsibility. We are free 
to do something about him; he is not.”189  
                                                            
 181 Id. at 103. 
 182 Id. at 104.  
 183 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 205 (D. Mass. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 187 Id.  
 188 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting 
his own dissent in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)). 
 189 Address by the Chief Justice, 25 Record of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York 
14, 17 (Mar. 1970 Supp.). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Providing medical treatment to transgender inmates is simply the right thing to 
do. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence teaches that prison officials cannot sit back 
and ignore the severe pain that some inmates suffer. It is hard to imagine that anyone 
who witnessed the attempted self-castrations of inmates such as De’lonta and 
Konitzer would turn a blind eye to their plight. Transgender inmates who are 
diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria need and deserve medical treatment just as much 
as inmates who are diagnosed with heart disease or diabetes. Even though Gender 
Dysphoria cannot be diagnosed by blood tests, it is a genuine medical condition.  
Having established that a diagnosed transgender inmate has a right to some 
medical treatment, the question, as posed in the title of this Article, is whether that 
inmate has a constitutional right to hormone therapy (or, in more severe cases like 
Kosilek’s, a right to surgery). Some have argued that he/she does not, and that 
psychological counseling should suffice as “adequate medical treatment” for a 
mental illness.190 However, physicians, psychologists, judges, insurance agents, and 
even the Tax Court have weighed the evidence and have concluded that 
psychotherapy and psychiatric medications are not “adequate” treatment in most 
cases.191  
Medical professionals and jurists have expended significant energy in an effort to 
understand and resolve the question of how to treat transgender individuals. 
Transforming the body to match the individual’s perceived gender identity is very 
controversial. Despite the controversy, the predominant view is that hormone 
therapy is a vitally important part of a treatment plan for some individuals with 
Gender Dysphoria. The current wisdom in the international medical community is 
that the three-step protocol is recommended: receiving hormone therapy, living for a 
period of time as the other gender, and then undergoing surgery if needed.192 
Whether Private Manning will be entitled to receive hormone replacement therapy is 
still unsettled, but Bradley/Chelsea should receive some medical care for Gender 
Dysphoria while imprisoned for the next thirty-five years.193  
The right to medical treatment is the focal point of this Article, but it is important 
to acknowledge some other related concerns. The conditions of Private Manning’s 
incarceration will be handled with thousands of eyes watching. Manning’s 
announcement that she wants to live as a woman in prison raises a host of other 
issues that must be addressed by the Fort Leavenworth officials such as her physical 
safety, privacy, and attire, along with the maintenance of order and prison security.  
                                                            
 190 See Walls-Stewart v. Warner, No. C12-5381 RBL-JRC, 2013 WL 1755793, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 19, 2013); see also supra text accompanying note 133.  
 191 See, e.g., Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012); 
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 122 (T.C. 2010). 
 192 Previously called the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, this three-step treatment 
protocol is referenced by many courts. See e.g., O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 37-38; Kosilek v. 
Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158-59 (D. Mass. 2002); E. Coleman et. al., Standards of Care 
for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7, 
13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165 (2011), available at http://wpath.org/documents2/socv7.pdf.  
 193 The first opportunity for parole will be in 2020. Julie Tate, Judge Sentences Bradley 
Manning to 35 Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
08-21/world/41431547_1_bradley-manning-david-coombs-pretrial-confinement.  
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Having identified herself as a woman in a man’s body, Manning will be at 
heightened risk for abuse at the hands of other prisoners. One transgender writer 
lamented that Manning may have made the [gender] transition even tougher than it 
would otherwise be, commenting that Manning “hasn’t done anything but put a giant 
bull’s-eye on her head.”194 The rape of a transgender inmate was what triggered the 
landmark litigation in Farmer v. Brennan, where the Supreme Court confirmed that 
prison officials must not be deliberately indifferent to the violent abuse of a 
vulnerable inmate by other prisoners.195 The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)196 
sets national standards for preventing rape in prisons. Despite the passage of the Act 
in 2003, rape continues to occur in prisons.197 Inmates who self-identify as members 
of the opposite gender are very likely at heightened risk for assault.198  
This increased risk of rape, abuse, and violent assault creates danger to Manning 
and also destabilizes the prison environment and threatens the security and order that 
prison administrators must maintain. Placing Manning in solitary confinement for 
her own protection, as is sometimes done, would not be a very satisfactory solution 
due to the particularly debilitating punitive effects of such isolation. In Farmer, the 
transgender inmate was isolated and confined apart from other prisoners for her 
safety, and the Supreme Court noted it but did not comment on whether solitary 
confinement was a satisfactory solution for avoiding further rapes and attacks on 
her.199  
Manning is incarcerated in an all-male facility in accordance with standard 
procedures indicating that inmates are housed according to their birth-assigned 
gender.200 Other transgenders who were born with male genitalia have been housed 
in male facilities.201 The question has been raised as to whether the transgender 
                                                            
 194 Kunnerth, supra note 161 (quoting Maia Monet, an Orlando writer). 
 195 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994). 
 196 42 U.S.C. § 15601-09 (2006).  
 197 For more information on rape in prisons, see Kim Shayo Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1630 (2012). 
 198 42 U.S.C. § 15601(3) (2006) (stating that inmates with mental illness have an increased 
risk of being raped in prison). 
 199 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830. To the extent that isolating a transgender inmate before any 
attack occurs may be construed as imposing an especially harsh punishment based on his or 
her status as a transgender, that practice might raise legal flags. Punishment can justifiably be 
imposed for specific acts, but citizens may not be punished based solely on their status. For 
example, someone can be penalized for drunk driving but cannot be incarcerated for being an 
alcoholic. Similarly, one could say that a transgender could be isolated for protection if 
violence occurs, but placing him or her in solitary confinement based solely on a perceived 
vulnerability would be unjustified. On the other hand, the failure to take proactive measures to 
protect a particularly vulnerable prisoner (while knowing that statistics show that he faces a 
heightened risk if placed with the general population) could also amount to deliberate 
indifference to that inmate’s safety. The balance is tricky. 
 200 Susan Donaldson James, Bradley Manning, Now Chelsea, Denied Hormones in Prison, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/bradley-manning-now-chelsea-
fights-hormone-treatment-prison/story?id=20036939. 
 201 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829; Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886 (E.D. Wis. 
2010).  
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inmate has a right to be incarcerated with members of his/her transferred gender.202 
Inmates generally have no right to request certain types of housing, and decisions on 
housing assignments are left to the discretion of prison officials.203 In a case where a 
transgender inmate who still had male genitalia asked to be transferred to a female 
facility, the court refused, saying simply “[a] male prisoner cannot be housed in a 
women's prison.”204 The court continued, “[e]ven though a transfer may relieve 
plaintiff's anxieties, clearly a violation of the women's rights would be at issue. 
Prison authorities must be given great deference to formulate rules and regulations 
that satisfy a rational purpose and segregation of the sexes is a rational purpose.”205 
Other requests, such as the ones made by Private Manning, involve the right to 
live as a woman, to dress as a woman, and to be called by a female name. Although 
these additional concerns are not fully addressed here, these issues have been raised 
by transgender prisoners in other Eighth Amendment suits.206 Deferring to prison 
officials on these questions, one court stated, “prison authorities must have the 
discretion to decide what clothing will be tolerated in a male prison and the court is 
not convinced that a denial of female clothing and cosmetics is a constitutional 
violation.207  
In conclusion, this Article asserts that the constitutionally correct thing to do is to 
protect and respect Private Manning’s individual rights no matter how abhorrent her 
betrayal of her country was, and no matter how bizarre her medical needs may seem 
to members of the general public. Judicial determinations indicating that prisoners 
have an Eighth Amendment right to receive medical treatment for Gender Dysphoria 
have not been popular. Biases still exist, as evidenced by the recent remark of a CNN 
legal commentator who snidely said that Private Manning would get “good practice” 
being a female in prison, and who called the idea of Manning receiving adequate 
medical care while serving her sentence “beyond insanity.”208  
While some may call it insanity, this Article advocates providing hormone 
therapy as part of a medical treatment plan for incarcerated transgender inmates who 
are properly diagnosed as having Gender Dysphoria and for whom such hormone 
treatment is prescribed. When an inmate can prove both prongs of the constitutional 
test, the Eighth Amendment mandates providing adequate medical care, even if such 
treatment baffles and enrages members of the public. If treatment is not provided, a 
transgender inmate may be able to obtain an injunction to compel prison officials to 
provide some type of medical treatment for Gender Dysphoria.209 Providing medical 
                                                            
 202 Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986). 
 203 Id. at 353. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 206 See, e.g., Konitzer, 711 F. Supp. at 886. 
 207 Lamb, 633 F. Supp. at 353. 
 208 Blake, CNN Commentator: Chelsea Manning will get “Good Practice” Being Female 
in Prison, LGBT HEADLINES BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013), http://headlinesblog.info/2013/08/27/
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 209 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846-47 (1994) (“If the court finds the Eighth 
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injunctive relief . . . [b]ut a district court should approach issuance of injunctive orders with 
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treatment is just one step in securing constitutional protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment for these inmates.  
As the Supreme Court has stated, the precepts of a decent and moral society 
mandate that the basic and fundamental needs of those who are imprisoned—and 
stripped of the ability to care for themselves—be met.210 The Court has recently 
stated again that “[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all 
persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment. ‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.’”211 Further, the Supreme Court 
emphasized, “[a] prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including 
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no 
place in civilized society.”212 Therefore, the just thing to do is to provide Gender 
Dysphoria treatment to Private Manning and other transgender prisoners who need 
similar sex-reassignment medical care. 
                                                            
the usual caution . . . and may, for example, exercise its discretion if appropriate by giving 
prison officials time to rectify the situation before issuing an injunction.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 210 See 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 4:1 (4th ed. 2013). 
 211 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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